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ABSTRACT. 
International intervention has increased in recent 
history for the abuses of humanitarian law and human 
rights. This article reflects on the history of human rights 
and humanitarian law reasoned interventions authorized by 
the United Nations Security Council and examines whether 
a duty now exists in international law for future action. The 
question of whether a duty exists, and the legal 
repercussions of failing to exercise that duty, is of 
paramount importance to international law. Whether the 
duty currently exists or is currently developing, the analysis 
that follows will show why the Security Council should 
have the duty of intervention and how the duty is emerging 
from both practice and necessity. 
 
AUTHOR. 
George Weber is President of the International Law 
Society and Editor in Chief of the Journal of International 
Law at the University of Baltimore School of Law. He 
serves as a student fellow to the Center for International 
and Comparative Law and will be earning a concentration 
certificate in International and Comparative Law when he 
earns his Juris Doctor in May 2013. He will also be 
attending Georgetown University Law Center to pursue his 
Master of Laws (LL.M.) degree in individualized study 
tailored to International Law, Foreign Relations Law of the 





Table of Contents 
Introduction             223 
 
I. Security Council: A Merely Permissive Legal 
Framework           226 
II. Importance of Human Rights, Humanitarian  
       Law, and the Responsibility to Protect        230 
III.  Intervention Beyond the United Nations  
Framework           235 
IV. Past and Present Practice of the  
Security Council           241 
V. Duty to Authorize Intervention –  
A Proposed Logical Legal Framework        252 
 







It was generally agreed that the situation in Libya, 
where government forces targeted civilians, authorized 
unlawful killings, committed sexual violence, and recruited 
children for armed conflict, was a violation of human rights 
and international humanitarian law.
1
  Due to the 
circumstances of armed violence in Libya, the United 
Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1973 (2011) to 
authorize intervention in order to stop violations of human 
rights law, international humanitarian law, and crimes 
against humanity.
2
  The Security Council authorized 
intervention, as it has done in the past, to protect people 
from internal abuse by state governmental authority.  
 This article examines whether the Security Council 
has developed a duty to authorize intervention when gross 
human rights and humanitarian law violations occur. 
Although past cases have seen the Security Council 
authorize intervention in situations where human rights and 
humanitarian law are violated, little thought is given as to 
whether there is a duty to authorize such intervention.
3
  
 In analyzing the question in support of a duty, I will 
examine the international importance placed on human 
rights and humanitarian law by treaty and custom; how the 
                                                           
1
 See. S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (March 17, 2011). 
Resolution 1973 describes the official reasons for authorizing 
intervention and gives the Security Council’s views regarding the 
situation in Libya as a definite violation of human rights and 




 See infra notes 85-120. 
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United Nations Charter framework, in its present form, 
ensures that human rights and humanitarian law are 
adhered to only on a selective basis; why the ultimate 
responsibility to ensure adherence falls to the Security 
Council; and how that responsibility has been exercised in 
the past by the Security Council.  
 This question is particularly relevant considering 
the “Arab Spring” taking place in northern Africa and the 
Middle East.
4
  In Syria, for example, there is extensive 
evidence that governmental forces have committed human 
rights violations against their own citizenry.
5
  In the case of 
Syria, however, the Security Council has been slow to reply 
compared to the overwhelming response to the Libyan 
situation.  Although the Security Council had at one point 
responded by requiring a cease-fire and sending unarmed 
observers, there is little evidence of that limited measure’s 
success considering the history of the protracted conflict 
                                                           
4
 The Arab Spring is “a succession of civilian uprisings” in the 
Middle East and Northern Africa targeted at oppressive regimes. 
Jonathan Masters, Issue Guide: One Year of ‘Arab Spring’ Upheavals, 




 See S.C. Res. 2043, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2043 (Apr. 21, 2012); S.C. 
Res 2042, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2042 (Apr. 14, 2012); Michael Haggerson, 
UN investigators: human rights violations in Syria increasing, JURIST 
(Sept. 17, 2012), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2012/09/un-investigators-
human-rights-violations-in-syria-increasing.php; Human Rights in 
Syria, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/node/106266 (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2013); Independent UN panel urges action amid 
ongoing human rights abuses in Syria conflict, UN NEWS CENTRE (Feb 
18, 2013), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44163&Cr=syria&Cr
1=human%20rights#.UVO0jL9i5hg; UN Report: Syrian forces commit 








When violations of human rights, international 
humanitarian law, and crimes against humanity occur, what 
entity other than the Security Council has the authority 
under international law to authorize intervention?  Are 
states able to intervene lawfully without the Security 




The question of whether a duty exists and the legal 
repercussions of failing to exercise that duty are of 
paramount importance to international law.  Regardless of 
whether there is an existing duty, this paper attempts to 
answer why the Security Council should have a duty to 
authorize intervention in the face of gross human rights 
violations while still respecting the fundamental precepts to 
the principle of non-intervention. Although there may not 
be enough agreement to state with certainty that such a duty 
currently exists, there is certainly evidence of an emerging 
duty on the part of the Security Council to intervene in 
cases of gross human rights violations.  Moreover, 
                                                           
6
 S.C. Res 2043, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2043 (April 21, 2012); S.C. 
Res. 2042, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2042 (April 14, 2012); Independent UN 
panel urges action amid ongoing human rights abuses in Syria conflict, 
UN NEWS CENTER (Feb 18, 2013), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44163&Cr=syria&Cr
1=human%20rights#.UVO0jL9i5hg; CNN Wire Staff, U.N. authorizes 




 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. The United Nations Charter 
specifically decries in Article 2(4) that states cannot violate the 
sovereign territorial integrity of another state. The exceptions to this 
rule are outlined in Chapter VII where the Security Council can 
authorize intervention. See U.N. Charter arts. 39-51. 
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international legal values suggest that such a duty should 
exist.  
My analysis will show why the Security Council 
should have a duty to authorize intervention in the face of 
gross human rights violations, and how a duty is emerging 
from Security Council practice and from necessity. 
I.  Security Council: A Merely Permissive Legal 
Framework  
The United Nations Charter sets up a framework 
where intervention into the territory of another state is only 
permissible when authorized by the Security Council or 
where self-defense is employed.
8
  The Security Council 
must even, under Article 39, determine the existence of a 
threat to international peace and security before the legal 
framework of the Charter will permit intervention.
9
  A 
possible exception to Security Council authorization and 
self-defense is the Uniting for Peace Resolution, which is 
discussed below.
10
 However, without any of the 
                                                           
8
 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; U.N. Charter arts. 39-43, 51. 
9
 U.N. Charter art. 39. 
10
 Uniting for Peace, G.A. Res. 377(V) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/Res/377(V) (Nov. 3 1950); “[T]he Assembly’s power in maintaining 
international peace and security is only recommendatory, not 
mandatory. It may only ‘make recommendation to the members of the 
United Nations or to the Security Council or to both’, ‘discuss any 
question relating to international peace and security’, call the attention 
of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger 
international peace and security’, and ‘recommend measures for the 
peaceful adjustment of any situation’. However where ‘Uniting for 
Peace’ resolutions are concerned, the General Assembly, not having 
mandatory power conferred upon it by the Charter, can adopt resolution 
that are binding in the sense that they are based on the principles of 
international law. The Assembly’s function in this regard is the focal 
point for state’ views on international law, not one that can be said to 
create a mandatory power and certainly not one that grants the 
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aforementioned justifications, intervention premised on any 
basis that affects the sovereign territory of another state is 
not permissible under the charter regime. 
 The legal basis for all intervention in the United 
Nations Charter is Chapter VII. Chapter VII allows the 
Security Council to determine a breach of the peace and to 
take actions with respect to that breach.
11
  However, this 
mechanism is completely voluntary—the determination of 
whether there is a breach is solely within the hands of the 
Security Council.  Failure to determine “the existence of 
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression”
12
 makes it impossible for intervention to occur; 
by not recognizing a situation requisite for a legal 
intervention, the world can do nothing. This entire process 
is within the hands of the Security Council to determine.  In 
the human rights context, this means that intervention is 
only legally valid if the Security Council declares a breach 
of international peace and security with regard to human 
rights violations is occurring, and authorizes intervention.  
Under the Charter, as it stands now, a determination 
that human rights violations are occurring, other than by the 
Security Council under Article 39, would not constitute the 
set of circumstances necessary to allow for intervention.
13
  
Even widespread international belief in the existence of a 
humanitarian crisis, human rights violations, or crimes 
against humanity would not be enough to allow the 
international community to intervene in such a way that is 
                                                                                                                    
Assembly a coercive power to order economic or military enforcement 
measures.” Kamrul Hossain, Complementary Rule of the United 
Nations General Assembly in Peace Management, Uluslararasi Hukuk 
ve Politika [UHP] [REV. INT’L L & POL] 77,79 (2008) (Turk.). 
11
 U.N. Charter arts. 39-42.  
12
 U.N. Charter art. 39. 
13
 U.N. Charter arts. 2, 39-42. 
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precluded under the Charter unless authorized by the 
Security Council.  The reality of this problem is 
contradictory to the philosophy behind the establishment of 
the Security Council.  Moreover, the only solution may be 
to circumvent the Security Council entirely. 
It has been suggested that the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Genocide Convention) may be a legal vehicle to 
circumvent the Security Council.
14
  It is true that Article I 
of the Genocide Convention calls on signatories to prevent 
and punish genocide
15
 but Article VII requires the 
signatories to go through the “competent organs of the 
United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the 
United Nations as they consider appropriate for the 
prevention and suppression of acts of genocide.”
16
  
 The Uniting for Peace Resolution is a possible 
solution to circumvent the Security Council’s necessary 
determination of a threat to international peace and security 
under Article 39, but it is imperfect – lacking the sturdy and 
forceful effect of Security Council action.  
 The Uniting for Peace Resolution is compelling 
because it shows the Charter regime is open to evolving 
interpretation; however, it is no substitute for the Security 
Council.
17
  The Resolution resolves that when the Security 
                                                           
14
 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 
1951); Eyal Mayroz, The Legal Duty to ‘Prevent’: After the Onset of 




 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 




 G.A. Res. 337(V) A, supra note 10, at 4. 
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Council cannot exercise its responsibility to maintain peace 
and security, the General Assembly can act in its stead, 
making recommendations for collective actions, including 
armed force, to maintain international peace and security.
18
  
The General Assembly has used this framework to 
recommend several actions with respect to the use of force 
when the Security Council was deadlocked.
19
  The 
International Court of Justice has advised that Uniting for 
Peace is legitimate under the Charter, including the 
General Assembly’s approval of use of force, but limits 
such authorization to the consent of the states concerned.
20
  
Although Uniting for Peace gives options to the General 
Assembly when the Security Council refuses to act, there is 
still some question as to how effective the General 
Assembly can be when utilizing the resolution.
21
  In 
particular, requiring the consent of the states concerned can 
be a huge obstacle especially in the human rights context, 
when permission is required from an offending state. 
The question of intervention would not be difficult 
to answer but for the United Nations Charter principle of 
non-intervention
22
 which prevents states from interfering in 
the internal affairs of other states. This is not to say, 
however, that the adoption of Article 2(4) was in any way a 
bad idea – preventing war and promoting peace is the most 
noble of ideas.  But the presence of Article 2(4) in the 
United Nations Charter creates an obstacle and prevents 
intervention in cases of human rights violations.  There is a 




 BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 1002-4 (6th ed. 
2011). 
20
 Id. at 1004; Kamrul Hossain, The Complementary Role of the 
United Nations General Assembly in Peace Management, 4 Rev. Int’l 
L. & Pol. 77, 83 (2008). 
21
 Carter, supra note 19, at 1004; See Hossain, supra note 20, at 83. 
22
 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
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need to remedy the obstacle of obstinacy on the part of the 
Security Council when it neglects to authorize intervention 
in situations where the humanitarian situation is dire.  The 
current Charter framework does not textually specify any 
positive duty of the Security Council in the intervention 
context.  Considering the fact that the Council itself is the 
only entity able to determine the “legal” existence of any 
threat to international peace and security, based solely on 
its own collective judgment and the ability of any one 
permanent member to veto measures designed to consider 
intervention, begs the question of whether a positive duty 
exists or whether one should be imposed.
23
  Clearly, there 
is need for a change; but is there a duty? 
II.  Importance of Human Rights, Humanitarian Law, 
and The Responsibility to Protect 
Human rights law and humanitarian law are of 
paramount importance in international law as a whole.  
Although both concepts are not the same, strictly speaking, 
they are interrelated.  Both branches of law are directly tied 
to the United Nations as well as to individual states.  
The International Court of Justice has described 
portions of international humanitarian law and human 
rights law as part of international custom so fundamental 
that they cannot be violated.
24
  Relatedly, human rights law 
is now looked upon and recognized as not within the sole 
                                                           
23
 See U.N. Charter arts. 2, 24, 25, 39–42; Judith A. Miller, 
NATO’s Use of Force in the Balkans, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 91, 91-92 
(2000-2001). 
24
 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8). 
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In fact, The Responsibility to Protect report, 
adopted by the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty, declares human rights to be a 
mainstream part of international law—a “central subject 
and responsibility of international relations.”
26
 Although 
the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty is a commission set up by the government of 
Canada, the report was recognized by the World Summit 
Outcome Document in 2005
27
, and its principles were 
subsequently adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly
28
 and the United Nations Security Council.
29
  
The report itself declares that states have a duty to protect 
the human rights of their citizens—that it is first the 
responsibility of state governments to protect citizenry 
                                                           
25
 Malcolm N. Shaw, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 278 (6th ed. 2008). 
26
 Rep. of the Int'l Comm'n on Intervention & State Sovereignty, 
The Responsibility To Protect, 6 (2001), available at 
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. The 
Responsibility to Protect references, as support, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the four Geneva Conventions and two 
Additional Protocols on international humanitarian law in armed 
conflict, the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, the two 1966 Covenants relating to civil, political, 
social, economic and cultural rights, and the adoption in 1998 of the 
statute for the establishment of an International Criminal Court. Id.  
27
 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005); The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 
26, at 2. 
28
 G.A. Res. 63/308, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/308 (Oct. 7, 2009); 
Mahrdad Payandeh, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? 
The Concept of the Responsibility to Protect Within the Process of 
International Lawmaking, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 469, 479 (2010). 
29
 S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006); see 
also S.C. Res. 1894, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1894 (Nov. 11, 2009); S.C. Res. 
1706, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006); Payandeh, supra note 
28 at 478. 
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from human rights abuses, humanitarian crises, and other 
international crimes such as genocide.
30
  But, if states fail 
to meet their responsibility, the international community 
assumes the responsibility to respond through the United 
Nations—particularly the Security Council.
31
  Human 
rights are thought to be universal—meaning state borders 
will not provide immunity from transgressions committed 
in the name of sovereignty.
32
 
Human rights protections are a reflection of values 
that are important and fundamental to the operation and fair 
treatment of other human beings.  Apart from being a legal 
issue of intervention, human rights violations are moral 
wrongs committed directly against the value of human 
existence. Internal state laws against killing and harming 
others reflect this.
33
  As a human society, we have come to 
the point where humane treatment is a staple right of all 
persons.  The evidence is present in the flood international 
covenants, treaties, and resolutions by the United Nations 
General Assembly and Security Council declaring 
genocide, torture, rape, unlawful killing, and violence as 
the antithesis of what is right for humanity.
34
  
In short, international human rights and 
international humanitarian law are of the utmost 
importance to the values of humanity.  However, when a 
                                                           
30
 The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 26 at XI; THOMAS 
BUERGENTHAL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL, 
119 (4th ed. 2009). 
31
 The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 26, at XII. 
32
 Kok-Chor Tan, The Duty to Protect, in HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 84, 90 (Terry Nardin & Melissa S.  Williams eds., 
2006). 
33
 See John Mikhail, Is the Prohibition of Homicide Universal? 
Evidence from Comparative Criminal Law, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 497, 
515 (2009-10). 
34
 See The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 26. 
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sovereign state violates or allows human rights violations to 
occur, there is no effective enforcement remedy under 
international law because there is no compulsory or 
consistent remedy offered or mandated by international 
law.  The only mechanism for authorizing intervention is 
the United Nations through the Security Council
35
, an 
entity that can at best be described as selective. 
International human rights are so important to the 
world order that the United Nations Charter included them 
as a paramount principle—Article 55 of the Charter states 
that the United Nations shall promote “universal respect 
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 




  Although the United Nations Charter is vague about 
how respect and observance of human rights is to be 
achieved, subsequent documents have defined the 
importance and standing of human rights as reaching the 
status of customary international law.
37
  The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, passed by the United 
Nations General Assembly, was interpreted, early on, as 
being “an authoritative interpretation of the United Nations 
Charter of the highest order” which has obtained the status 
of customary international law.
38
  In addition to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, two treaties, the 
International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural 
                                                           
35
 U.N. Charter, arts. 39-51. 
36
 U.N. Charter art. 55, para. c. 
37
 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III) 
A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); Abdullahi Na-na'im, 
The Rights of Women and International Law in the Muslim Context, 
WHITTIER L. REV. 491 (1987); Shannon Oliver, The International Fight 
for Human Rights: Women Lately Discovered, 2 HOWARD SCROLL: 
THE SOCIAL JUST. REV. 77, 85-86;  
38





 (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights
40
 (ICCPR), were ratified by many 
states—showing the widespread acceptance by the world 
community.
41
  In fact, some academics and theorists 
believe that certain human rights have achieved the status 
of jus cogens
42
 when it comes to crimes of physical 
violence including torture, extra-judicial executions, 
genocide, war crimes, disappearances, crimes against 
humanity, and massive human suffering.
43
  They are 
regarded as the highest category of international law, and of 
such consequence that violation of human rights amounts to 
a crime of the highest severity.  K. Lee Boyd writes that jus 
cogens crimes entail individual as well as state 
responsibility to safeguard against the commission of such 
crimes and equating a violation thereof to be a disruption of 
the domestic and international order.
44
  Andrea Bianchi 
                                                           
39
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, 
U.N. Doc. A/6136 at 490 (1966); opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 




 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for 
signature Dec. 19,1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
41
 Oliver, supra note 37 at 96. 
42
 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Recognition of Victims’ 
Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203, 203-79 (2006); K. Lee Boyd, 
Universal Jurisdiction and Structural Reasonableness, 40 TEX. INT’L 
L.J. 1, 36 (2004). A jus cogens norm is a “peremptory norm of general 
international law . . . accepted and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character.” Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, opened for signature May 
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
43
 Bassiouni, supra note 42; Boyd, supra note 42; M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga 
Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 68 (1996). 
44
 Boyd, supra note 42; Bassiouni, supra note 42.  
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describes human rights, in general, as being synonymous 
with jus cogens–that they developed together.
45
   
The United Nations Charter memorializes human 
rights as a paramount concern of the international 
community.  Although human rights can be said to have 
originated before the Charter, it is the United Nations 
Charter framework, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and all subsequent treaties, conventions, 
resolutions, and the like that have raised human rights to 
the level of customary international law and defined their 
importance as worldwide human values.  In short, human 
rights are deserving of the highest protections, from the 
individual level all the way to the international level 
because when states fail to protect their citizens, or worse 
commit human rights violations against them directly, only 
a remedy with teeth will protect the prized rights of our 
fellow men and women—intervention by the international 
community.  
III. Intervention Beyond the United Nations 
Framework 
 Examining history is a good place to start when 
discussing why the United Nations Charter Article 2 
framework is so preventive.  
Professor Mortimer Sellers, in his article The 
Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention Under 
International Law declares “humanitarian intervention has 
always played an important part in international 
relations.”
46
  He asserts that even the strongest proponents 
                                                           
45
 Andrea Bianchi, Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens, 19 
EUR. J. INT’L LAW 491, 491-92 (2008). 
46
 Mortimer Sellers, The Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention 
Under International Law, 7 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 67 (2001). 
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of the principle of sovereignty have made exceptions for 
intervention on “public welfare” grounds.
47
  Further, there 
are examples of states, prior to the creation of the United 
Nations, acting consistent with this theory. 
In the 17th century, legal scholars believed that 
intervention was appropriate when the mistreatment of state 
nationals was occurring in another state that was so bad as 
to shock the conscience of the international community.
48
  
It was said that this doctrine co-existed with the concept of 
sovereignty
49
—that sovereignty was not absolute and there 
could exist circumstances that would supersede the 
sovereign authority of the state.
50
  This concept, as stated 
above, originated with the premise that protection of the 
state’s nationals abroad was an interest that superseded the 
offending state’s authority—that this doctrine of protecting 
rights fundamental for human existence, over time, equated 
to universal rights that are so essential that a state cannot 
violate them.
51
  This led to the legal doctrine allowing 
intervention by other states when the denial of human 
rights occurred.
52
  In fact, Professor Sellers mentions that 
“under ordinary international law, as it has existed for 
centuries, states are entitled to take diplomatic, economic 
and other ‘measures’, individually and collectively, against 
states that have violated their international obligations.”
53
  
The reference to “other measures” is a reference to the use 
of force. 
                                                           
47
 Id. at 67. 
48
 BUERGENTHAL, supra note 30, at 3.  
49
 FRANCIS KOFI ABIEW, THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE AND 
PRACTICE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 22 (1999). 
50






 Sellers, supra note 46, at 72. 
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By the end of the 19th century a majority of 
international legal scholars believed that the right of 
intervention on humanitarian grounds existed.
54
  This 
intervention had rules that governed when interference was 
allowed–an international legal restraint perhaps.  
Intervention would occur based on the grounds of “tyranny, 
extreme atrocities, and violations of specific fundamental 
rights” by the offending state.
55
  Additionally, there was a 
preference that there be collective action by several states, 
as opposed to unilateral intervention, and the intervention 
only be instituted if undertaken for humanitarian motives.
56
  
The preference for collective intervention was later 
memorialized in the United Nations Charter and can be 
seen in several articles.
57
 
Several instances during the 1800s highlight the 
exercise of this principle.  From the intervention of France, 
Britain, and Russia in Greece from 1827–1830 to stop 
massacres committed by Turks;
58
 to the intervention of 
France, after authorized by Britain, Austria, Prussia, 
Russia, and Turkey, in 1860 in Syria to restore order;
59
 to 
the intervention of Russia in the Balkans in 1877 due to 
harsh treatment by the Ottoman Empire;
60
 and finally by 
the United States in Cuba following the Cuban revolt 
against the Spanish for humanitarian reasons.
61
  
Despite the limiting principles in this legal doctrine, 
it was often misused as a pretext for war.
62
  The largest 
                                                           
54
 Abiew, supra note 49, at 40. 
55
 Id. at 43. 
56
 Id. at 42-43. 
57
 See U.N. Charter, arts. 43–49.  
58
 ABIEW, supra note 49, at 48. 
59
 Id. at 50. 
60
 Id. at 51. 
61
 Id. at 54. 
62
 BUERGENTHAL, supra note 30, at 3. 
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example of using humanitarian intervention as an excuse 
for war was Hitler’s argument that “Aryan” minorities were 
bring oppressed in other states as a reason to incorporate 
Austria into Germany and to justify the invasion of Poland 
and Czechoslovakia.
63
  Consequently, Germany’s actions 
and the failure of the League of Nations to prevent another 
world conflict, drove the victors of World War II to create 
the United Nations—hence the current Charter framework 




 The old humanitarian principles that predate the 




Kok-Chor Tan argues that, today, there is a general 
duty, on the part of the international community, to 
intervene—that when intervention is permissible, it is also 
obligatory.
66
  He stresses that The Responsibility to Protect 
report supports the theory that there is an “international 
responsibility to protect” when human rights violations 
occur that “shock the conscience of mankind.”
67
  Professor 
Sellers agrees when he states, “some level of interference 
by governments or individuals to prevent the human rights 
abuses of others must be tolerated.”
68
 
Both the General Assembly and Security Council 
have adopted the Responsibility to Protect doctrine in 
                                                           
63
 ABIEW, supra note 49, at 56-57. 
64
 Id.  
65
 Eve Massingham, Military Intervention for Humanitarian 
Purposes: Does the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine Advance the 
Legality of the Use of Force for Humanitarian Ends?, 91 INT’L REV. OF 
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resolutions declaring its protection principles to be 
paramount.
69
  Although it is probably not held as a 
customary international law norm, its presence in United 
Nations resolutions and international discourse on 
intervention at the very least shows the impact of The 




The main point of The Responsibility to Protect 
doctrine is that sovereignty is not absolute—that 
sovereignty contains the responsibility of states to protect 
their subjects and citizens.
71
  Under The Responsibility to 
Protect, failure of states to meet their responsibility to 
safeguard, or in cases of willful commission of harm 
against people, will result in the abrogation of sovereignty 
and the international community will assume the 
responsibility to remedy the situation.
72
  
Six principles contained in The Responsibility to 
Protect establish criteria for international intervention that 
gives the international community guidelines as to when 
intervention is appropriate and permissible.
73
  These 
principles are (1) Just Cause, allowing the international 
community to intervene only when there is an extraordinary 
amount of suffering occurring; (2) Right Intention, where 
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the international community can only intervene if it is for 
the purpose of stopping human suffering; (3) Proportional 
Means, which requires the international community to use 
the most minimal means to stop human suffering; (4) Last 
Resort, which requires all non-military options to be 
exhausted before force is used; (5) Reasonable Prospects, 
where military intervention will not take place unless there 
is a reasonable likelihood that it will be successful; and (6) 
Right Authority, where Security Council authorization 
should be sought before intervention occurs.
74
 
Support for The Responsibility to Protect doctrine is 
growing.  According to Rebecca Hamilton in The 
Responsibility to Protect: From Document to Doctrine civil 
society organizations, state governments, and international 
bodies, including the United Nations, are endorsing the 
principles of The Responsibility to Protect.
75
  Growing 
support of The Responsibility to Protect doctrine 
necessitates a mechanism in international law that supports 
the principle of intervention in response to gross violations 
of international law.  The Security Council, under the 
United Nations Charter, has the authority to act as the 
international community’s voice in these matters.
76
  
The Security Council’s practice, as detailed below, 
shows that the precedent has already been established to 
authorize intervention in situations where human rights 
have been violated.  Essentially, The Responsibility to 
Protect doctrine has already been utilized, albeit not always 
explicitly by reference, in situations where the Security 
Council has authorized intervention to remedy human 
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rights violations.  But with an emerging responsibility of 
the international community to intervene, evidenced by 
increasing support of The Responsibility to Protect, the 
current Security Council framework is not sufficient to 
support the responsibility of the international community.  
Is a Security Council duty to authorize intervention 
necessary?  Probably so.  To say otherwise would ignore 
the responsibility of the international community and, at the 
same time, the United Nations Charter. 
IV.  Past and Present Practice of the Security Council 
There is evidence of an emerging duty on the part of 
the Security Council to authorize intervention in gross 
human rights violations.  The past practice of the Security 
Council has shown that by authorizing intervention with 
respect to human rights and humanitarian law violations, it 
compels authorization to intervene in certain situations in 
the future.  Such practice, at a minimum, can be evidence 
of the Security Council’s ability to make international law 
at least with respect to the United Nations Charter 
framework.
77
  The Security Council’s past actions on 
human rights and humanitarian issues is compelling 
evidence that a self-created duty to intervene is emerging. 
The Security Council has stated in past resolutions 
that “widespread violations of international humanitarian 
law” constitute threats to peace under the United Nations 
Charter.
78
  In fact, Malcolm Shaw believes that the Security 
Council’s practice in the area of “civil war and internal 
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In the past, the Security Council has authorized 
intervention for the purpose of securing adherence to 
international human rights.  The United Nations has an 
interest in authorizing intervention in areas where human 
rights violations have taken place because of the 
importance that human rights and humanitarian law play in 
international law in general.  This interest has come, not 
from the argument for a legal duty for intervention to 
occur, but rather because of the international pressures and 
obligations surrounding past conflict.  In these situations, 
the Security Council used the current United Nations 
Charter framework to intervene.  
The authors of International Human Rights in a 
Nutshell, consider the decisions by the Security Council to 
include hints that the old customary international law 
doctrine of collective intervention, present before the 
creation of the Security Council, may be becoming more 
prevalent.
80
  The Security Council has not referred to any 
pre-UN doctrine specifically—although, as mentioned 
previously, there has been reference to the newer 
Responsibility to Protect.  However, the Security Council’s 
decisions show that there is at least a belief in the 
international community that intervention should be 




The belief that the Security Council should 
intervene in gross violations of human rights started after 
the end of the Cold War when an increase in action, 
                                                           
79
 Id. at 1240. 
80
 BUERGENTHAL, supra note 30, at 5. 
81
 Id. at. 4. 
243 
 
pursuant to humanitarian crisis and human rights violations, 
started to take place under the auspice of Chapter VII of the 
Charter.
82
  Chapter VII, which applies to “threats of the 
peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression,”
83
 
would now apply to human rights cases as well.
84
  
The Security Council’s main focus is to maintain 
international peace and security.
85
   Is not the violation of 
human rights and international humanitarian law a breach 
of international peace and security?  The Security Council 
has determined that it does in many cases, as described 
below.  In many situations, beginning in the 1990s, the 
Security Council had declared threats to international peace 
and security for human rights and humanitarian reasons.  In 
the following examples, the motives of the Security 
Council included the position that human rights are of the 
highest importance and must be protected.  Pursuant to 
Article 39, they determined a threat to international peace 
and security, and acted to authorize intervention. 
In 1992, under Resolution 770, the Council 
determined that the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
warranted use of force to protect humanitarian interests.
86
  
The Security Council described the situation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina as constituting “a threat to international peace 
and security” reasoning that humanitarian violations, 
including abuses committed against civilians, were a major 
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Later in 1992, the Security Council authorized 
another intervention with “military enforcement 
measures”
88
—this time in Somalia. Under Security Council 
Resolution 794 the Council described the “magnitude of the 
human tragedy caused by the conflict” combined with “the 
obstacles created to the distribution of humanitarian 
assistance” created a threat to international peace and 
security.
89
  The resolution further expressed alarm “of 
widespread violations of international humanitarian law 
occurring” which included reports of “violence and threats 
of violence” against those engaged in humanitarian efforts, 
“deliberate attacks on non-combatants, relief consignments 
and vehicles, and medical and relief facilities,” and in 
stopping help from arriving to those in need.
90
 
A few years later, in 1994, the Security Council 
authorized military intervention in Rwanda.  Under 
Security Council Resolution 929, the Council described the 
“magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda” as 
constituting “a threat to peace and security in the region.”
91
  
The Security Council referenced the killing of civilians by 
the parties to the conflict and the displacement that those 




  Later in 1994, the continued situation in Haiti, 
which originated from the ousting of the elected president, 
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turned into a humanitarian crisis moving the Security 
Council to act by passing Resolution 940.
93
  The resolution 
was passed because of, among other reasons, “the 
significant further deterioration of the humanitarian 
situation in Haiti, in particular the continuing escalation by 
the illegal de facto regime of systematic violations of civil 
liberties” and the “plight of Haitian refugees.”
94
  Under 
Chapter VII, the resolution granted intervention authorizing 
“member states to form a multinational force under unified 
command and control and, in this framework, to use all 
necessary means” to end military leadership, return the 
ousted president and restore legitimate authorities, and to 
“establish and maintain a secure and stable environment” 
under the Governors Island Accord.
95
 
In 1996, the Security Council authorized 
humanitarian intervention in Zaire.
96
  The resolution 
authorizing intervention stated that the “situation in eastern 




In 1997, the Security Council again authorized 
intervention for humanitarian reasons in Albania under the 
auspice of the crisis being a “threat to international peace 
and security in the region.”
98
  Resolution 1101 called for an 
end to the acts of violence occurring in Albania and 
authorized “a temporary and limited multinational 
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protection force to facilitate the safe and prompt delivery of 
humanitarian assistance, and to help create a secure 
environment for the missions of international organizations 




In 1999, the Security Council, under Resolution 
1244 authorized an international civil and security presence 
in Kosovo in order “to resolve the grave humanitarian 
situation” and “to provide for the safe and free return of all 
refugees and displaced persons to their homes.”
100
  The 
resolution describes the situation in Kosovo to be one of 
“humanitarian tragedy.”
101
  The resolution also states that 
one of the key purposes of the international security force 
was to protect and promote human rights.
102
  
Later in 1999, the Security Council determined that 
a threat to international peace and security continued to 
exist in East Timor—authorizing a United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) 
“empowered to exercise all legislative and executive 
authority, including the administration of justice.
103
  The 
threat existed because of “the grave humanitarian situation 
resulting from violence in East Timor and the large-scale 
displacement and relocation of East Timorese civilians, 
including large numbers of women and children”
104
 and 
because of “reports indicating that systematic, widespread 
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and flagrant violations of international humanitarian and 
human rights law have been committed in East Timor.”
105
 
In 2003, the Security Council authorized an Interim 
Multinational Force in the Congo to, among other things, 
“contribute to the improvement of the humanitarian 
situation.”
106
  The resolution authorizing intervention refers 




Later in 2003, the Security Council authorized the 
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), a stabilization 
force created for humanitarian intervention reasons.
108
  The 
resolution declared: “the situation in Liberia continues to 
constitute a threat to international peace and security in the 
region, to stability in the West Africa sub region, and to the 
peace process for Liberia.”
109
  The threat to international 
peace and security was declared to be because of, among 
other reasons, the “violation of human rights, particularly 
atrocities against civilian populations, including widespread 
sexual violence against women and children.”
110
 
In 2004, the situation in Haiti again was determined 
to constitute a threat to international peace and security by 
the Security Council.
111
  The adopted resolution cited 
evidence of a threat existing due to the continuing violence 
and deterioration of the humanitarian situation.
112
  The 
resolution authorized the deployment of a Multinational 
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Interim Force to “maintain public safety and law and to 
promote and protect human rights.”
113
 
Later in 2004, the Security Council authorized 
African Union observers in Darfur because of the “ongoing 
humanitarian crisis and widespread human rights 
violations, including continued attacks on civilians that are 
placing the lives of hundreds of thousands at risk.”
114
  The 
Security Council determined the situation constituted a 
threat to international peace and security.
115
  In 2006, the 
Security Council reiterated that the situation was a threat to 
international peace and security and began the process of 
incorporating a United Nations operation.
116
  In 2007, a co-
United Nations-African Union force was implemented by 
the decision of the Security Council.
117
  In that decision, the 
Security Council stated that it regarded the situation 
occurring in Darfur to be a violation of human rights and 
international humanitarian law and that the situation was 
still a threat to international peace and security.
118
  
Most recently in 2011, the Security Council 
authorized intervention in Libya.
119
  The resolution, while 
precluding an occupations force, gave member states the 
ability to use “all necessary measures” to protect civilians 
and populated areas under attack by Libyan governmental 
forces.
120
  Use of force allowed the Libyan opposition to 
fend off attack, prevent killings by governmental forces, 
and eventually topple the Qadhafi regime that committed 
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The above situations determine for certain that the 
Security Council is not limited to the strict interpretation of 
the Charter.  The Council has shown that its power to 
determine “threats to international peace and security” can 
apply in other contexts,
122
 in particular, within the realm of 
humanitarian and human rights contexts through Article 39, 
which makes decisions binding.  The above situations show 
that the Council has determined humanitarian and human 
rights violations to constitute threats to international peace 
and security. 
The previously illustrated situations, if not creating 
a state practice standard important to create customary 
international law binding on states, almost certainly place 
an international law custom standard important for 
international law interpretation binding on the United 
Nations Charter.
123
  Inger Osterdahl states, “The way the 
Security Council interprets and applies the UN Charter has 
an effect on the import of the Charter because Security 
Council is an authoritative and important body within the 
Charter system and, moreover, holds the rare power to take 
legally binding decisions.”
124
  He goes on to suggest that, 
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through practice, the Security Council makes Charter law 
and that the only way the Security Council could cease this 
practice is to stop adopting resolutions.
125
  Adding to 
Osterdahl’s premise, Articles 25 and 49 require member 
states to carry out decisions of the Security Council, giving 




Though traditional standards of creating law 
through performance, i.e. state practice, apply to states in 
creating general customary international law, it makes 
sense to allow Security Council practice to play a role in 
interpreting the United Nations Charter. Further, Security 
Council practice could create a traditional customary 
international law norm in existence outside the Charter law.  
As such, the practice of the Security Council in authorizing 
intervention in the human rights and humanitarian 
situations described above, over time, is creating an 
emerging duty on the Security Council to intervene if the 
above examples are to be given weight under the “practice” 
portion of creating customary international law. 
If the Security Council can make Charter law, the 
Security Council, through its past actions, is declaring to 
the world that human rights and humanitarian law 
ultimately deserve forceful intervention when all other 
measures fail.
127
  In so declaring, the Security Council 
establishes a duty upon itself because it is the only entity 
that can authorize such action.  
In the alternative, assuming arguendo that the 
Security Council cannot use its own actions to interpret the 
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Charter framework, do not the actions of the states taking 
part to enforce the Security Council’s decisions in cases of 
humanitarian and human rights violations show that state 
practice and opinio juris exist to support the duty?  Should 
the act of states “merely” carrying out the authorization of 
the Security Council, through continued practice of 
intervening on behalf of these principles establish such a 
duty on the Security Council by traditional customary 
international law methods?  I think that it does.  States take 
part in drafting the resolutions (through membership), take 
part in the decisions of the Security Council (as members), 
and carry out binding decisions (by direction).
128
  Such a 
process, if applied to situations of one doctrine—human 
rights and humanitarian law—surely satisfies the customary 
international law prerequisites of state practice and opinio 
juris.  Essentially, it can be argued that states intervening 
pursuant to Security Council resolutions are establishing 
state practice and the Security Council and participating 
states are establishing opinio juris. 
The counterargument to the proposition that 
Security Council interventions are creating an emerging 
duty to intervene is that there are times when the Security 
Council may have decided not to authorize intervention.  
Of course, non-intervention is difficult to address because 
traditional methods of creating international law refer to 
practice, not the lack thereof, to be the constitutive element 
of customary international law.  In fact, looking at lack of 
practice in this area would serve little purpose.  Law 
develops over time.  As such, a linear observation must be 
taken into account.  As illustrated above, the Security 
Council has been increasingly willing to intervene in 
situations on the more recent part of history’s timeline.
129
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This should be taken into account because, as times change, 
so does the law (as it should).  Law is not stagnant; it is 
molded with the experience and actions of our world.  The 
Security Council’s practice shows that its influence on the 
Charter reflects progressive and modern ways of looking at 
and valuing the human condition.
130
  
Inger Osterdahl, commenting on inconsistent 
Security Council practice states, “even though it acts in an 
inconsistent or ad-hocish way, whatever action the Security 
Council takes has a normative impact.”
131
  The combined 
notion of accepting practice (as opposed to non-practice), 
the restrictive circumstances upon which Security Council 
action affects only Charter interpretation, and the increased 
nature of interventions show that non-intervention should 
not be considered when interpreting the Charter framework.   
V.  Duty to Authorize Intervention – A Proposed 
Logical Legal Framework  
Although I have already posited an emerging duty 
on the part of the Security Council based on its own 
practice, a logical, normative argument can also be made in 
favor of imposing a duty on the Security Council. 
Premise: The Security Council has a duty to 
intervene when human rights violations have occurred. Is 
there an alternative?  The Security Council, and no other 
entity, has the power to authorize intervention under the 
United Nations Charter framework.
132
  Because of the 
refusal of the Security Council to get involved in some 
areas where clear human rights and humanitarian law 
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violations are occurring, there is a disconnect.  A refusal to 
accept a situation exists to preclude states from acting, just 
as refusing to act in the face of a recognized humanitarian 
crisis.  Before the United Nations came into existence, 
there was a clear right of states to intervene—a right 
present before the proliferation of human rights and 
humanitarian law in the international context.
133
  
Today, there is an international standard for human 
rights and humanitarian law, as well as a voluntary remedy 
through the Security Council for violations of that law.  But 
this is not enough.  For the following reasons, the current 
UN charter framework and the current state of international 
humanitarian law and human rights demands that the 
Security Council be required to authorize intervention in 
cases of humanitarian and human rights gross violations. 
International law makes humanitarian and human 
rights violations unlawful.
134
  The duty, first and foremost, 
falls to the individual state to ensure adherence to the 
law.
135
  This is as it should be.  States should take care that 
subjects and citizens are guaranteed their human rights, and 
should refrain from committing any sort of violation 
against them.  However, sometimes states do not comply 
with this principle.
136
  In such a case, the state has failed to 
exercise its duty. 
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When the state fails in its duty to ensure 
humanitarian and human rights, it becomes an international 
issue and concern, as humanitarian and human rights law is 
of international concern.  The humane treatment of people 
is an interest that the human condition demands.  Thus, as 
an international issue, the United Nations, being the forum 
and entity that has emerged as the central international 
body on Earth, assumes the issue on behalf of the 
international community.  Again, individual states, or 
coalitions of states, cannot interfere at this point in any 
other way than through diplomacy and other actions short 
of intervention, as the United Nations Charter will not 
allow it
137
 unless and until the Security Council permits 
it.
138
  By signing onto the United Nations Charter, 
individual member states gave up the portion of their 
authority to make unilateral decisions with regard to use of 
force without “world” consent (i.e., without the Security 
Council’s approval). 
The legal dilemma comes to a head when the 
permissive framework meets the passive or non-interested 
state parties. 
Assume there is a universally understood situation 
of gross humanitarian and human rights violations 
occurring in the world—a situation that is generally agreed 
upon by the majority of United Nations member states as 
constituting a situation in dire need of intervention, but the 
Security Council is deadlocked.  Because states cannot 
interfere without the authorization of the Security Council 
by virtue of the United Nations Charter, there is a deadlock 
in international law.  People are harmed without any 
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remedy to alleviate their suffering or make the situation 
right, except by taking up arms.
139
  
The question that I posed earlier is still relevant.  
Can the duty fall to any other entity under the current state 
of international humanitarian and human rights law in light 
of the current United Nations Charter framework?  No.  By 
sheer necessity, the Security Council holds the duty to 
authorize intervention, as a last resort, in cases of gross 
violations of humanitarian and human rights.  Based upon 
the importance that the international community has placed 
on humanitarian and human rights, it is evident that it is of 
utmost concern to ensure that those rights are adhered to.  
Thus, a logical conclusion is that a duty has arisen.  By 
virtue of the international legal framework existing in the 
form of the United Nations Charter, that duty falls to the 
Security Council in humanitarian and human rights 
cases.
140
  Similar to the reasons Professor Sellers gave for 
interference sometimes being necessary because it cannot 
be totally avoided in any legal system, the duty of the 
Security Council is necessary here because it is the only 
entity that can act, it has acted before, and it is necessary 
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The Security Council should have a duty to 
authorize intervention in circumstances of gross violation 
of human rights, humanitarian law, or crimes against 
humanity.  It is likely that the duty, as understood under 
customary international law, is not currently present.  
However, what appears to be an emerging duty out of the 
Security Council’s practice is promising for the future of 
human rights and humanitarian law enforcement.  
Normative arguments are also promising as they give an 
alternative to the “practice” assertion.  
Before the formation of the United Nations, 
intervention was a collective right of states.
142
  During the 
pre-United Nations period, however, the prevalence of 
human rights and humanitarian law was not as paramount 
and defined as it is today.  The establishment of the United 
Nations and the proliferation of humanitarian law and 
human rights, including the new category of crimes against 
humanity, establish that the treatment of humanity is a 
paramount concern of the world community.  That 
paramount concern is expressed through the United 
Nations.  Expression of this vital concern is manifested and 
remedied by the Security Council in its actions to cure 
situations where humanitarian violations exist.  As the 
Security Council is the mechanism set up to maintain world 
order and ensure the peace and prosperity of the world, it 
makes sense that it have a duty to espouse the values of 
humanity by enforcing international human rights and 
humanitarian law.  That a duty will arise on the part of the 
Security Council seems inevitable, if not already present, as 
described by normative arguments. 
                                                           
142
 See Supra notes 48-64. 
257 
 
Failure of a state to protect its citizens or 
affirmative actions taken to harm civilians necessitates 
authorization for intervention.  The Security Council was 
established up to maintain international peace and security 
but its purpose evolved to enforcing human rights and 
humanitarian law.  There is no other entity that can 
authorize intervention. When all diplomatic options fail, the 
world turns to the Security Council for authorization to 
intervene.  Its duty should always be to authorize 
intervention when great suffering occurs, when people are 
massacred, where torture is present, and where the state 
cannot or will not protect the people—essentially in 
situations of gross human rights violations.  In the face of 
the protracted situation in Syria, and other instances of 
humanitarian and human rights atrocities occurring around 
the world, the need for recognizing a Security Council duty 
to authorize intervention is paramount and necessary. 
 
